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Putting the Culture into Bioculturalism 




Abstract: In Chapter 6 of Film, Art, and the Third Culture, Murray Smith argues for a 
biocultural account of the emotions, which treats them as an interaction between universal 
and cultural dimensions. He goes on to test this approach in relation to the representation of 
emotions in films by considering an example from the tradition of modernist filmmaking. 
This article suggests that, while Smith’s case is broadly convincing, there are several ways in 
which it could be presented more forcefully. In particular, his discussion of the challenge of 
modernism to a biocultural account could be strengthened by emphasizing rather than 
downplaying the role that various types of cultural knowledge play in our interaction with 
modernist works. 
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When Raymond Bellour complained that “in their dogmatic application of knowledge of the 
cognitive sciences, most cognitive theoreticians of the cinema are . . . inevitably attracted by 
Steven Spielberg’s films and Hollywood blockbusters” (2010: 92), one can only presume that 
he was unfamiliar with Murray Smith. Far from limiting his attention to the “average, 
standardised” film, the “bad cinema” that Bellour (following Deleuze) sets against the “real 
cinema” of directors such as Chris Marker and Alain Resnais (2010: 91–92), Smith has 
always been interested in a wide variety of films and filmmakers. His first book, Engaging 
Characters (1995), explored viewers’ emotional responses to cinema by juxtaposing the 
work of classical Hollywood directors like Alfred Hitchcock and Otto Preminger with the 
 
Soviet montage films of Sergei Eisenstein and Alexander Dovzhenko and the modernism of 
Robert Bresson, Luis Buñuel, and Raúl Ruiz, and this “comparative approach” (Smith 2017: 
9) has continued in his subsequent research. It comes as no surprise, then, that Smith’s new 
book, Film, Art, and the Third Culture (2017), explores a diverse range of filmmaking 
traditions. These include Hollywood both old (Hitchcock again, along with Howard Hawks) 
and new (Paul Greengrass, M. Night Shyamalan, and, yes, Spielberg), but also the European 
art cinema of Carl Theodor Dreyer, Lars von Trier, and Julio Medem along with films by 
non-Western directors such as Takeshi Kitano and Wong Kar-Wai, and the work of 
experimental filmmakers such as Stan Brakhage and John Smith. A characteristic example of 
Smith’s approach can be found in Chapter 3’s exploration of neuroscience’s potential 
contribution to the study of film, where a discussion of the startle response compares and 
contrasts scenes from Jon Favreau’s Iron Man (2008) and Akira Kurosawa’s Ran (1985). 
Smith’s insistence that there are useful connections to be made between apparently 
discrete areas of the cinematic landscape offers a riposte to the suspicion that many film 
scholars still harbor toward the research tradition within which he operates.1 This suspicion 
goes something like this: an awareness of certain evolved human features and capacities may 
provide insights into low-level perceptual phenomena that are common to all films that we 
watch, such as critical flicker fusion and apparent motion. It might even give us an 
understanding of how certain widespread cinematic practices have “piggybacked” onto 
pancultural norms of behavior (for example, David Bordwell [1996] argues that the 
shot/reverse-shot convention commonly used in films to represent an interpersonal exchange 
draws on and streamlines “contingent universals” of human interaction such as face-to-face 
encounters, conversational turn-taking, and the deictic gaze). But, the suspicion holds, this 
kind of approach is not going to be useful for analyzing less conventional, less broadly 
appealing films, which may require higher-level interpretative practices on the part of the 
 
viewer that are more culturally specific and which may avoid stylistic devices that mesh 
neatly with our natural capacities. 
In both his new book and elsewhere, Smith confronts this suspicion, and he is right to 
do so. If a naturalized aesthetics is going to explain our experience of art, it should be able to 
shed light on a variety of works, including those that manifest various degrees of originality 
and innovation (since these are factors that we generally value in artworks), as well as those 
that provoke “the shock of discomfort, or the bewilderment or the anger or the boredom” that 
Leo Steinberg (1972: 5) suggests we feel when faced with an unfamiliar artistic style. In what 
follows, I discuss one section of Chapter 6 of Film, Art, and the Third Culture, which deals 
with this kind of challenge in reference to the tradition of modernist filmmaking, since this is 
one area where I think Smith’s case could be presented more forcefully. I then offer a few 
suggestions as to some possible avenues to explore in this regard. 
The section I wish to address comes within a broader discussion of emotion as “an 
integral feature of ordinary existence” that is “central to our experience of most forms of art” 
(Smith 2017: 154–155). Smith proposes that we should “steer a course between” a culturalist 
account of emotions, which sees them as almost entirely culturally constructed, and a 
biological account, a strong version of which sees emotions as universal across cultures and 
basically hard-wired into us as a species via evolution. He argues instead for “a biocultural 
view which rejects the dichotomous views of both emotion and the study of emotion.” 
According to this model, culture arises “from certain evolved features of the human species” 
(2017: 156–157), and cultural variation is a series of adaptations (or by-products of 
adaptations) to different environments and social relationships. Thus, while culture and 
biology may conflict with one another at times, they are nevertheless mutually dependent. 
From this biocultural perspective, an “emotion episode” (163) can be understood as a 
dynamic interaction between an immediate hard-wired affective response and a subsequent 
 
process of cognitive monitoring that leads to more fine-grained distinctions and more 
complex subtypes of emotion, thus allowing for considerable cultural variation. 
From here, Smith goes on to explore how this biocultural account of the emotions can 
be relevant “to our experience and understanding of a work of film art” (2017: 166), focusing 
specifically on the representation of emotions and on our recognition of the emotional states 
of characters in a scene from the German film series Heimat 3: Chronik einer Zeitenwende 
(Edgar Reitz, 2004). His choice of this example relates to the fact that it may appear to 
present a significant challenge to the biocultural account of emotions because it involves 
cultural specificity in several ways. First, since it traces the lives of several generations of 
Germans across the twentieth century, understanding Heimat could be thought to require a 
fairly detailed knowledge of German culture, history, and language. Second, while 
Hollywood movies revolve around scenarios and psychological states that are relatively 
universal (and so may be a good match for a naturalistic approach, which can help us explain 
their accessibility to a wide international audience), a film such as Heimat is designed for 
“narrower audiences possessing specific sorts of cultural knowledge” (166). Third, Smith’s 
choice of Heimat is based on its association with the tradition of modernism, which he 
characterizes as a self-conscious and experimental mode of artistic practice that positions 
itself against the so-called transparency of mass art.2 The idea, then, is that if bioculturalism 
can accommodate the cultural particularity of an example like this one, even while it rejects 
the culturalist account of emotions, it will have met the challenge of showing the value of a 
naturalized aesthetics not just for conventional, broadly accessible works but also for more 
unusual ones. 
While the case Smith makes throughout the book for a naturalized aesthetics is 
convincing, and while it is one to which I am sympathetic, his testing of the biocultural 
account of the emotions against the challenge of modernism could be strengthened in several 
 
ways. Most broadly, it would benefit from a more detailed account of the “dominant 
culturalist paradigm” (2017: 15) that he rejects. Who exactly are the cultural extremists that 
would consider Heimat to be inaccessible to viewers unfamiliar with Germany’s language, 
history, and culture or to those unaccustomed to or bewildered by modernist art? While he 
does mention the anthropologist Catherine Lutz’s (1988) warning that Western theories of 
emotion are inevitably shaped by Western cultural categories and assumptions and will 
therefore distort the emotional experience of non-Westerners, the work to which he refers is 
30 years old. It would be useful to know how widely Lutz’s culturalism is maintained by 
current anthropologists. Certainly, some branches of anthropology now accept Paul Ekman’s 
findings on the universality of basic emotions and emotion expressions while recognizing 
that this still leaves “a great deal of room for cultural fine-tuning” (Anderson 2011: 319). But 
even if Lutz’s views do represent a school of thought that still prevails, it is not clear that her 
objections are relevant to the case of Heimat, which as part of “the tradition of European 
artistic modernism” (2017: 166) falls firmly within the domain of Western culture. 
When it comes to the particular case of modernism, I would also appreciate more 
evidence to support Smith’s suggestion that “[t]o the modernist sensibility, the easy cross-
cultural accessibility of Hollywood fare is an intellectually nutritionless gruel” (166). While 
the idea of modernist art as an attack on other systems of representation is a persistent one 
among critics, it is not clear that it is necessarily held by artists themselves, and it would be 
useful to learn whether filmmakers such as Kitano and Wong, both of whom Smith includes 
under the banner of modernism, consider their work to be in opposition to mainstream 
American cinema. It would also help to know whether Heimat has in fact proved any more 
challenging to general audiences than the “international popular filmmaking embodied by 
Hollywood product” (166) against which he positions it, and, if it has, whether this challenge 
 
was felt by both German and non-German viewers—which would support the idea that it is 
not just local cultural knowledge that is the difficulty here. 
Smith’s attempt to show that “a naturalistic approach can shed light on experimental 
as well as orthodox works” and his rejection of a “contemporary culturalist view [that] 
emphasizes the differences and even ‘incommensurability’ among works emerging from 
distinct cultures” (2017: 14–15) might also benefit from more distinct and unorthodox 
examples. Put simply, the scene from Heimat that he analyzes, which depicts an “emotion 
episode” made up of a series of emotional subevents as one character reacts to her elderly 
mother’s arrival first with surprise, then puzzlement, then anxiety, then reassurance, and 
finally relief, turns out (at least by his account) to be not especially culturally particular and a 
pretty mild form of modernism. 
First, there is the issue of language. Smith suggests that viewers who do not 
understand German can still make sense of the actions and emotions that the film represents 
by means of subtitles, along with “more extended critical commentary” (2017: 172) for those 
concepts that are not succinctly expressed in English. While subtitles can certainly provide a 
translation of dialogue that allows viewers to comprehend the gist of a scene’s emotional 
content, it would have been worth acknowledging that they bring with them their own 
problems. Most significant, perhaps, is the fact that, as Mark Betz (2009: 50) points out, 
subtitles “often leave significant portions of the dialogue untranslated” due to restrictions of 
space and time. Anyone who has watched a subtitled foreign film in a language in which they 
are reasonably proficient will have noticed that the version of the dialogue offered by the 
subtitles is a simplified one that tends to iron out or simply omit cultural specificity and local 
flavor. As a result, subtitles work against just that “semantic unpacking” that Smith proposes 
as a means of understanding “initially unfamiliar emotion concepts” (2017: 173). By ignoring 
the possible limitations of subtitles for providing thorough linguistic access to the film, Smith 
 
paints himself into a corner. Since, by his own admission, he is “almost entirely ignorant of 
the German language” (166) and is therefore at the mercy of the subtitles, how can he know 
that the dialogue in the scene he has chosen does not involve any of those “culturally specific 
terms” (173) that would require unpacking? We might also note a further drawback of 
subtitles: since “they divide viewer attention between reading text and watching images” 
(Betz 2009: 50), they may distract us from visual details such as facial expressions, including 
eye behavior, that would otherwise provide useful cues for comprehending characters’ 
emotions. 
When it comes to other forms of local cultural knowledge that might be useful for 
understanding the emotion episode represented in the scene, such as a familiarity with social 
norms, Smith effectively sidesteps the issue by asserting that no such knowledge is required, 
at least for Western European audiences: “a British and German viewer are likely to share 
preconceptions about the issue [of care of the elderly] and the range of attitudes it elicits, 
precisely because both are from modern European liberal democracies” (2017: 174). This 
may well be the case, but if the point is to counter the claim that cultural particularity is an 
inevitable barrier to comprehension for cultural outsiders, why not look at an example that 
involves some significant cultural particularity? 
Then there is the matter of the scene’s aesthetic qualities. Since elsewhere in the book 
Smith discusses “facial expression in modernist cinema” in relation to the unconventional 
stylistic practices of Kitano and Bresson, both of whom tend to deny us access to characters’ 
emotions by minimizing expressive facial behavior on the part of their performers (2017: 
147), we might expect his Heimat example to also involve some significant challenge to the 
realistic portrayal of emotions generally found in much mainstream cinema. In fact, the scene 
offers a fairly standard treatment of emotional expression, with the actors providing relatively 
naturalistic performances that are rendered legible by way of stylistic elements such as 
 
lighting (high-key), framing (medium shots and medium close-ups), and staging (frequently 
frontal), to the point where, for example, we are able to discern an absence of muscle activity 
around one character’s eyes and understand by this that her smile is insincere. As Smith 
recognizes, “Heimat is hardly a work of unalloyed aesthetic realism; and yet its performance 
style answers to many of the patterns of behaviour that we encounter in reality” (2017: 175). 
It is thus not clear how this example is any more “unnatural” in its depiction of emotions than 
the Hollywood films it is supposed to stand in contrast to. Why is a biocultural account 
necessary when almost everything of significance can be explained by universals? An 
example highlighting rather than downplaying the role of specific cultural knowledge would 
allow Smith to demonstrate the potential of the biocultural approach more forcefully. 
With this in mind, in the space that remains I offer a brief discussion of one modernist 
work, the Japanese New Wave film Eros + Massacre (Eros purass gyakusatsu, Yoshishige 
Yoshida, 1969). I have chosen this film because, after watching it several times, I feel that I 
still only partially understand it, a situation I believe relates to various sorts of cultural 
specificity, some having to do with “local” historical and linguistic knowledge, and some 
with formal and stylistic practices characteristic of cinematic modernism. What follows is not 
a detailed analysis of the film, but an attempt to raise some issues that could be explored 
further regarding the “interplay between cultural and biological factors” that Smith 
emphasizes (2017: 153). 
Several types of cultural knowledge might be thought necessary, or at least desirable, 
in order to understand and appreciate Eros + Massacre. Some of these relate to the film’s 
subject matter and themes. The narrative juxtaposes two plotlines: one is set in the past 
(1916–1923) and revolves around the life and death of the historical figure Sakae Ōsugi, a 
Japanese anarchist and advocate of free love who was murdered, along with his mistress, Noe 
Itō, and his nephew by the military police; the other is set in the present (1969) and concerns 
 
a female student, Eiko, who is investigating Itō’s relationship with Ōsugi. Soon after the 
film’s release, Yoshida explained that Ōsugi “is well known in Japan, he’s almost legendary” 
(Bonitzer and Delahaye 1970: 10). Consequently, many of its initial Japanese audiences 
would have approached the film armed with expectations about its protagonist that may have 
been confounded or confirmed, an experience to which viewers unfamiliar with Ōsugi’s 
biography (which, we should note, might include modern Japanese audiences) do not have 
access. The narrative does start with a prologue offering some basic expository information 
about Ōsugi, but without more detailed knowledge of the social and political structures of 
early-twentieth-century Japan (specifically, the Taishō period in which the story takes place), 
many details of Ōsugi’s rebellion against the mores of his time are obscure. Historical 
knowledge might also help contextualize the film’s second narrative line. For example, a 
familiarity with Japanese student politics of the 1960s could clarify Eiko’s fascination with 
Itō and Ōsugi. While a viewer familiar with Western European radical politics of the 1960s 
might assume some broad similarity with the Japanese situation, Yoshida’s reference, when 
discussing Ōsugi, to “the anarchist students, the Zengakuren” (Bonitzer and Delahaye 1970: 
11) suggests that there is more local knowledge that would be useful to make sense of the 
specific issues at play. How might viewers’ understanding of the film’s subject matter vary 
depending on the historical knowledge they possess, and how might this affect their 
emotional response to the film? 
Since the film’s dialogue is in Japanese, viewers like myself who are reliant on 
subtitles in English (which belongs to a different language family) might feel less confident 
than in the case of Heimat’s German (to which English is closely related) that these will 
allow them fluent comprehension of the emotional interactions between characters that many 
scenes involve. Of course, this is a matter of degree—there is no hard and fast definition of 
what constitutes fluent comprehension. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that a translation 
 
from Japanese into English risks smoothing over or distorting semantic nuances that a native 
speaker would grasp. For example, a comparative analysis of conceptual metaphors involving 
the heart and related body parts in English and Japanese finds that, while there is 
considerable overlap in conceptual patterns between the two languages, metaphors involving 
the Japanese word hara (stomach/belly) can encompass processes of thinking and decision-
making as well as feeling. This suggests that, while English maintains a “‘dualistic’ 
dichotomy” between emotion (heart) and rationality (mind), in Japanese there is “no division 
of labor between the rational and emotive modes of communicating” (Berendt and Tanita 
2011: 76). Since one of the central themes of Eros + Massacre is the relationship between 
politics and sexual love, it is possible that references to “heart” in the subtitles (which might 
be translating any of the Japanese words kokoro [heart/core/mind], mune [breast/chest], or 
hara) are imposing foreign cultural constructs regarding the emotive and rational aspects of 
interpersonal relationships. Do viewers who need subtitles come away from the film with a 
less precise understanding of its themes than those who speak Japanese? 
What of the film’s formal and stylistic practices? We can first note the rather opaque 
plot structure (with story events regarding Ōsugi and Itō presented out of temporal order, 
unspecified ellipses between scenes, and a general absence of time markers), which limits our 
ability to construct a clear causal chain. The relationship between the two narrative lines is 
also quite complex. Scenes set in the past are sometimes staged in modern settings, and 
characters from past and present occasionally meet, as in a sequence in which Eiko 
interviews Itō while they walk through contemporary Tokyo. In fact, there is some ambiguity 
as to the status of the scenes involving Ōsugi and Itō: should we consider them to be 
relatively objective, or do they represent Eiko’s imagined version of the past? We might also 
understand some of them as unsignaled subjective flashbacks offering Itō’s own recollection 
of prior events. While this indeterminacy is a characteristic feature of international art 
 
cinema, we should not assess its effect independently of cultural contexts related to the film’s 
country of origin. My familiarity with art cinema conventions may help me recognize that the 
film’s juxtaposition of its two narrative lines implies some thematic parallels between past 
and present, but without the knowledge of Japanese history discussed above, how well-
equipped am I to infer what those parallels might be? 
 
[INSERT FIGURES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURES 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE – i.e., to form a “box of four images”] 
[CAPTION: Figure 1. Stylistic strategies for withholding facial expressions in Eros + 
Massacre / Eros purass gyakusatsu (NBCUniversal Entertainment Japan, 1969).] 
 
An interaction between the film’s modernist aesthetics and more “local” cultural 
aspects can also be seen in the difficulty I have understanding characters’ emotions. This is 
partly a result of several stylistic devices that Yoshida uses to withhold the kinds of facial 
expressions that allow me to “read” emotions in Heimat. Characters are often filmed in long 
shot, or from high or low angles, or positioned behind reflective surfaces and other elements 
of mise-en-scene that obscure their faces (Figure 1). In addition, actors sometimes adopt what 
seems to me to be an impassive performance style. But whether I am seeing a realistic 
portrayal of emotional reticence or a stylized suppression of facial expression (or something 
in between the two) is harder for me to judge in the case of a national culture of which I am 
relatively unfamiliar. How can I know to what extent my incomplete understanding of the 
film is an intended effect of artistic strategies common to the international culture of 
modernist cinema (in Chapter 5 of the book, Smith analyzes many of the same techniques as 
they have been used by Bresson, Kitano, and Wong), and to what extent it derives from my 
ignorance of specifically Japanese cultural matters? 
 
Smith’s call for a naturalized aesthetics opens up a range of possibilities for how the 
tools of the humanities and the natural and social sciences can contribute to the study of film. 
Despite the skepticism of some within film studies, this does not mean only focusing on 
mainstream cinema or on the biological constraints, innate to us as humans, under which 
filmmakers and film viewers operate. It also means appreciating the considerable freedom 
that is possible within those constraints. One of the ways we can do this is by analyzing 
unorthodox, idiosyncratic films, doing justice to the role that various types of culture play in 
our interaction with them. 
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1 While Smith describes his project as a naturalized aesthetics of film, he has long been 
associated with “the cognitive approach,” which has been characterized by Ted Nannicelli 
and Paul Taberham as “an investigation of cognition, encompassing attention, learning, 
memory, reasoning, problem-solving, and perception, that draws upon research in a variety of 
disciplines, including anthropology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience, 
philosophy, and psychology” (2014: 5). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Although Smith initially describes Heimat as an example of “European artistic modernism” 
(2017: 166, my italics), his references to modernism elsewhere in the book include examples 
(Kitano, Wong) that suggest he views it as a more wide-ranging tradition. While this broad 
characterization might be thought to ignore just that cultural specificity in which he claims to 
be interested, his discussion of these and others filmmakers highlights that, even when they 
use similar stylistic strategies to restrict viewers’ access to characters’ emotions, they have 
different aims in doing so (147–151). 
